注册 | 登录
  • 首  页
    |
  • 关于学会
    |
  • 网上入会
    |
  • 学术年会
    |
  • 学会论文
    |
  • 学会课题
    |
  • 学会报告
    |
  • 学会活动
    |
  • 产学研基地
    |
  • 特约研究员
    |
  • 资料中心
    |
学会介绍 学会章程 会员管理服务及收费办法 组织机构 学会领导 专家委员会 学会年度工作计划 学会文件 联系方式
入会须知 注册会员 理事申请表下载 会费标准及缴纳方式
关于年会 历届年会回顾 最新年会动态 最新学术年会征文 历届获奖名单 特约评委申报 关于分论坛 分论坛申请 历届分论坛
征文通知 征文提交 物流经济 物流管理 物流技术与工程 采购 供应链管理 英文文献
课题介绍 课题通知 课题计划 历年获奖课题 课题申报 课题结题 课题申报书下载 课题延期申请表下载 研究报告格式规范下载 结题报告模板下载
关于报告 中国物流发展报告 中国物流重点课题报告 中国物流学术前沿报告 中国物流园区发展报告 中国冷链物流发展报告 生产资料流通发展报告 中国采购发展报告
中国物流发展报告会 全国物流园区工作年会 物流企业财税与投融资工作会 产学研结合工作会 中国物流学术年会 日日顺创客训练营
管理办法 产学研基地动态 申请表下载 申请表提交 基地复核 产学研会议信息
管理办法 申请流程 聘任条件 申请表下载 特约研究员相关文件
学会工作动态 物流政策及评论 学术年会论文 学术年会资料 学会报告 会员通讯 领导讲话 学会文件 学会课题 其他
  • 2005年
  • 2006年
  • 2007年
  • 2008年
  • 2009年
  • 2010年
  • 2011年
  • 2012年
  • 2013年
  • 2014年
  • 2015年
  • 2016年
  • 2017年
  • 2018年
  • 2019年
  • 2020年
  • 2021年
  • 更多...
当前位置:首页 > 资料中心 > 学术年会论文 > 英文文献 > 2009年
A Study on Incentive Contract Based on Testability of Logistics Service Output
来源: 时间:2012/10/30 18:47:08 作者:Zhang Dehai
  

Abstract: The incentive contract is an important factor for logistics servicesupply chain, which will affect its whole performance. In the paper, aiming tothe problem of asymmetric information among the members, we firstly constructthe principal-agents model for multiple suppliers when the integrator gives an incentiveby the testability of logistics service. Then, we have done a comparativeanalysis between the two different contracts and address the factors and methodaffecting contract. Finally, we put forward some advices so as to allot inreason the output of logistics service supply chain and realize its holisticoptimization.

Key words: Logistics Service Output; Measurability; Principal-agent;Incentive Contract

1 Introduction

For several years, as globalization ofeconomic and intensification of market competition, logistics customers needhigher and higher request. In order to adopt to the change, logisticsenterprises gradually evolve to logistics service supply chain (LSSC) which iscomposed of logistics service supplier, logistics service integrator andcustomer including manufacturer or retailer. Under the LSSC mode, the logisticsservice integrator is core enterprise which provides integrated logistics servicesolution scheme to costumers and tailors the basic and advanced logisticsservice to them (Andersson, 2002).

Now, in the framework of economic ofinformation many scholars studied LSSC from some viewpoints and gained somepurposes. According to Grovesscheme, an incentive mechanism of information share in LSSC is elaborated on (Feldmann,2003). In a study (Wei, 2000), the author develop a game-theoretic model thatstudies the contract design problem of a third party logistics buyer when she/heis faced with a third party logistics provider and the quality of and the costof the service provided are private information to the latter. There is also astudy on incentive mechanism of the fourth party logistics subcontract withprincipal-agent theory (Wang, 2006). Recently, aimed to the procurement oflogistics service, we analyzed four different market types by using signal gameprinciple (Zhang, 2006).

In essence, all the authors assume that the outputof logistics service may be observed independently. However, when LSSC provideslogistics service for their customer, all members in fact created a jointproduction — ensuring that customer gets the right products to the right placeat the right time, and at the right cost, all with the help of the LSSC. Thus,it is very difficult to independently observe the output of every member inLSSC and then bring a challenge about constructing an incentive contract. Inthe paper, we will import the testability of logistics service output into twodifferent principal-agents models for multiple suppliers. Then, we have done acomparative analysis between the two different contracts in order to provide adecision-making reference for logistics service integrator (LSI).

2 Principal-AgentsModel

Generally, LSSC includes two kinds ofparticipants, a LSI and some logistics service integrator (LSS). After shesigns a contract about logistics service with logistics customer, LSI will designa solution for logistics service and merge resources and capability of LSS inorder to put the solution into practice. LSS only takes on one or a fewlogistics function, such as transportation, storage, distribution and package.Amidst the principal-agents model in this paper, LSI is regard as principal andsome LSSs as agents. When agents realize their own expected utility, theprincipal can gain her own maximal objective by the incentive mechanism toagents. In light of the characteristic of LSSC we put out some assumption asfollows:

需要[2]积分

阅读全文

关于我们 | 媒体互动 | 站点留言 | 友情链接 | 在线投稿 | 网站地图

地 址: 北京市丰台区丽泽路16号院2号楼铭丰大厦1601(100073) 电 话:010-83775681 E-mail:CSL56@vip.163.com
Copyright 2000-2019 in 中国物流与采购联合会、中国物流学会版权所有 技术支持:中国物流与采购联合会网络事业部
中国物流与采购网:京ICP备05024070号 中国物流联盟网:京ICP备05037064号