Abstract: Gametheories were used to study the problem of quality control in the two-echelonsupply chain which has one manufacturer and one supplier in this paper.Firstly, A Stackelberg game was introduced into the quality control of atwo-echelon supply chain. In this general non-cooperative quality control gamesituation, the manufacturer acts as the leader, the optimal action policieswere obtained for the manufacturer and the supplier. Then, a Nash Bargainingmodel was used to analyze optimal action selection in the cooperative qualitycontrol game situation and to determine the profit segment between two supplychain members after collaboration. By comparison of two game equilibriumresults above, it was found that the cooperative quality control game structureis superior to the general non-cooperative quality control game structureduring the process of quality management in the two-echelon supply chain. Finally,a numerical example is used to verify the conclusions of this paper.

Key words: supplychain; quality control; game

1 Introduction

Along with the economic integrate in world and thetechnical development in science, the SCM play an important part in enterprisemanagement. At present, the competition is not only between two enterprises,but also between two supply chains. With the arrival of supply chain era,traditional quality management theory inside the companies must be updated tosupply chain quality management theory so as to meet the need of socialdevelopment.

In the environment of supply chain, product qualityis guaranteed and completed by all the members in the supply chain. Due to thelimitation of space and time, the communication and coordination among themembers in the supply chain become difficult. Thus, it is necessary toconstruct a Spanning Time and Space working environment. The development ofnetwork, telecom and Internet provide technological basis for the cooperationof the members. However, a good cooperative quality management mechanism ismore important because it is the driving force of the members’ cooperation inthe supply chain so as to establish a win-win relation among them^[1]. 

Manyscholars at home and abroad use game theory to study the problem of qualitycontrol in supply chain by means of contract coordination. Stanley, Paul andMadhav（2000）analyze the relation between product quality, the costof quality, and the information that can be contracted upon. Their analysis emphasizesthat the subtle effects on quality that arise from variations in thecontractible information within a supply chain^[2]. SA Starbird（2001）studies the effect ofrewards, penalities, and inspection policies on the supplier’s behaviour aboutproduct quality^[3].