基于赛局理论的中国物流园区发展策略研究

黄世政¹ 崔玮²陈燕燕³

¹国立中山大学 企业管理学系 博士候选人

                                                     ² 深圳市盐田港股份有限公司规划发展部 主管             

                                         3 中国物流学会特约研究员

联络作者：黄世政¹,( d004010018@student.nsysu.edu.tw)

摘要

物流园区是物流产业发展重要组成部分，在发达国家物流园有效管理促进了为物流产业发展。中国物流园区在迅速发展同时，缺乏科学规划、盲目建设与经济发展不匹配、已建成的物流园区同质化现象较严重。物流有效需求不足和运营成本的变动导致市场恶性竞争，物流园区发展陷入了“囚犯困境”。论文运用赛局理论在完全信息静态、考虑区域效应和聚集效应的前提下，对物流园区协同发展深入探析。首先，Hotelling模型通过比较分析物流企业在不同环境下的选址行为, 探寻物流园区形成的原因；其次，囚犯困境理论剖析了地方政府在物流园区发展的策略，揭示物流园区初始建设会陷入囚犯困境；最后，用Bertrand模型分析物流园区通过合作，可以获得更高的收益，且可以缩减规模，节约成本。物流园区之间应协同发展才能双赢，才能发挥物流企业的规模化效应，从而为物流园区发展，园区物流企业竞争和园区间协同发展提出解决问题的基本思路。

关键词：物流园区，囚犯困境，赛局理论，协同发展

Study on the Development Strategy of Chinese Logistics Park Based on Game Theory

Shi-Zheng Huang¹, Cui Wei² Chen YanYan³

¹Professor of Business Management, National Sun Yat-sen University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan

²ShenZhen Alumni AssociationoftheNational People's CongressofChina，ShenZhen，China

 Correspondence: Shi-Zheng Huang²(szhuang06@gmail.com)

Abstract：Logistics parks plays an important role in the development of logistic industry. The efficient management in developed countries encourages the development of logistic industry. With the rapid development of logistics parks in China, the lack of scientific planning, the unchecked construction, the failure of matching economy development and the coessential change remain problems in the process. The market vicious competition which brought by lack of logistical effective needs and change of operating costs leads the development of logistics parks to “prisoner’s dilemma”. By using game theory, the article takes a deeper analysis on the coordinated development of logistics parks on the basis of complete information static and consideration of area effect and aggregation effect. First, Hotelling model explores the reason for the formation of logistics parks by comparing different siting behaviors of logistics enterprises in different contexts. Second, the prisoner’s dilemma analyses the strategies of logistics parks made by local government, in order to show that logistics park can be transformed into prisoner’s dilemma at the beginning of construction. Last, by using Bertrand model, the article analyses that logistics parks can obtain more profit, reduce scale as well as save cost through cooperation. In order to get win-win, logistics parks should coordinated. Moreover, only by coordination can logistic enterprises have the large-scale effect, so as to achieve the purposes of logistics cost savings and logistics service quality improvement, so that offer basic ideas to solve problems for the development of logistics parks, the competition among logistics enterprises and coordination development among parks.

Keywords: Logistics Park,prisoner’s dilemma,Game Theory, Coordinated Development.